Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2008

ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
Claims: Securities Litigation under the Guise of
ERISA?
Clovis Trevino Bravo
Georgetown University Law Center, clovis.trevino@macleoddixon.com

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/spps_papers/6

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/spps_papers
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Retirement Security Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Student Papers Series

October 2008

ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
Claims: Securities Litigation under the Guise of
ERISA?
Clovis Trevino Bravo
Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2008

cjt25@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
BePress: http://lsr.nellco.org/georgetown/spps/papers/6/
Posted with permission of the author

ERISA MISREPRESENTATION AND NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS:
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE GUISE OF ERISA?
Clovis Trevino Bravo*

ABSTRACT
In the wake of recent corporate scandals and dramatic market downturns, many employees
whose defined contribution plans were heavily invested in employer stock have experienced
substantial losses in their anticipated retirement savings. To recover for their losses, plan
participants have filed a number of lawsuits under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) alleging that plan fiduciaries made misrepresentations or failed to
disclose material information about the suitability of investing in the company stock. These
controversial suits are usually derivative or companion cases to securities class actions based
on the same allegations of misrepresentations or nondisclosures. Even though there is a
significant overlap between the ERISA and the securities suit, the procedural, remedial, and
substantive rules governing the two actions are quite different. By juxtaposing these rules, this
Article examines whether ERISA fiduciary misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims amount
to securities litigation in disguise; and if so, whether these claims should be allowed to proceed
in the absence of the procedural safeguards imposed by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”).
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of recent corporate scandals and dramatic market downturns, many
employees whose company-sponsored retirement saving plans were heavily invested in the
stock of their employers have seen their account balances substantially depleted.1 To recover
for their losses, some plan participants have filed lawsuits under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”)2 alleging that plan fiduciaries made misrepresentations or

*Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2008; University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, B.A. 2005. I am
thankful to Professor Donald Langevoort for his valuable guidance from the conception through the completion of
this Article. I woud also like to thank Professor Mark Poerio for his helpful comments and to Jennifer Locke
Davitt for excellent research help.
1

See generally Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing and Beyond: Implications for Workers, 76 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 815 (2002).
2

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).

1

failed to disclose information about the suitability of investing in the company stock.3 These
controversial suits are generally derivative or companion cases to securities fraud class actions
arising out of the same alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures. Even though the
securities and ERISA lawsuits are based on the same underlying facts, the procedural and
substantive rules governing the two actions are substantially different. The question arises: are
these lawsuits securities litigation under the guise of ERISA? If so, should they be allowed to
proceed in the absence of the procedural safeguards imposed by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)?4
Thus far commentators have addressed this overlap only partially or incidentally;5
hence the need to address in this Article the procedural, remedial and substantive differences
between the ERISA and the Securities action side by side. Following this introduction, Part I of
this Article presents a brief overview of ERISA fiduciary duties. Part II identifies the most
significant procedural and remedial differences between the ERISA lawsuit and the securities
class action. Part III discusses disclosure duties under ERISA and the Securities laws, and Part
3

This article does not address the issue of whether ERISA fiduciaries are liable for imprudence in allowing
continued investment in employer stock. See generally Craig C. Martin, Matthew J. Renaud and Omar R. Akbar,
What's up on Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605 (2006) (discussing imprudent
investment claims).

4

PUB. L. NO. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. For a discussion of the procedural requirements of the PSLRA, see Michael
A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 689-94 (2002).

5

See Shelby D. Green, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? That Is the Question for the Corporate Fiduciary Who Is
Also a Pension Plan Fiduciary Under ERISA: Resolving the Conflict of Duty, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 831
(2007) (arguing that the ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose could be read to require fiduciaries with insider
obligations to advise employees that further investment in the company would not be wise, but without stating
why, if that would reveal non-public corporate information); Mark Casciari and Ian Morrison, Should the
Securities Exchange Act be the Sole Federal Remedy For An ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value Of
Public Employer Stock? 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637 (2006) (“ERISA does not provide an additional remedy”
for misrepresentations or nondisclosures.”); Craig C. Martin and Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: an
Evolving Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 912 (2005) (briefly discussing some significant procedural
differences between ERISA and securities law liability); Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn’t Sell
My Company Stock: Is There an ERISA (or ’34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 385, 423-24 (2004)
(arguing that recognizing an ERISA claim for misrepresentations and nondisclosures that would not constitute a
securities law violation does not do violence on Congress' securities law goals, but questioning whether ERISA
should provide a remedy when such behavior is arguably both a violation of ERISA and of the securities laws).

2

IV examines whether securities and ERISA misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims
overlap, complement, or are in conflict with each other. This Article concludes that the
substantial overlap and potential conflict between the two actions warrants substantive
clarification and procedural harmonization to clarify fiduciary duties and employee rights and
to prevent plaintiffs’ lawyers from using ERISA to evade the protections that the federal
securities laws provide against abusive litigation.
I.

ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted to “assure
the equitable character” and financial soundness of retirement and other benefit plans.6 ERISA
imposes on plan fiduciaries the highest standard of conduct known to the law.7 These duties
include the duty to act prudently, to follow directives from_plan participants, to monitor, to
diversify investments, and to act loyally. ERISA fiduciary duties are not limited by the
statute’s express provisions: the legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress intended
to incorporate into ERISA the core principles of trust law to define the general scope of
fiduciary authority and responsibility.8
ERISA contemplates two basic types of pension arrangements: defined benefit and
defined contribution plans.9 When ERISA was enacted, the predominant pension structure
offered by United States publicly traded companies was the defined benefit plan, under which
employers guarantee a pension benefit determined by using a formula that adjusts benefits
6

Id. § 1001(a).

7

See, e.g., Flanigan v. General Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453
(6th Cir 1988).

8

See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pp. 3-5, 11-13 (1973)); A
Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Committee Print Compiled for the
Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Library of Congress, Ser.
No. 93-406, pp. 2350-2352, 2358-2360 (1976); see also Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir.
1983).
9

29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34)-(35) (2000).
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based on variables such as age, length of service, and final salary.10 Now the predominant
structure of retirement coverage in the United States is the defined contribution plan,11 which
provides benefits derived from the contributions made by or on behalf of an employee to an
account during his or her employment.12
The increase in the number of defined contribution plans is almost wholly attributable
to the availability of the 401(k) plan.13 These plans give participants the opportunity to manage
their retirement savings by directing contributions among numerous investment alternatives. 14
In almost [_%] of 401(k) plans offered by U.S. public companies, the sponsoring company’s
stock is one of many investment options, but plan participants tend to invest overwhelmingly in
the stock of their employer.15 As a result of special tax preferences for heavy investment in
company stock,16 many 401(k) plans have designated the employer stock fund as an Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)—a defined contribution plan designed to be primarily invested

10

See Daniel Fischel and John H. Lagbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55
U. CHI. L.REV. 1105, 1112 (1988).
11

See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451 (2004)
(discussing the rise of the defined contribution plan).

12

See generally Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming
ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L. J. 1, 4–13 (2000).

13

Regina L. Readling, Rethinking "The Plan": Why ERISA Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to
Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan Accounts, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 315, 326 (2008) (citing James A.
Wooten, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Political History 3 (2004) at 279).
14

Employee Benefits Security Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees 1 (2006), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k-employee.html.

15

See generally Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV 539 (2002) (Symposium) (offering several explanations for such heavy plan investments in
employer securities, including context dependence, optimistic bias, loyalty, and pressure).
16

See Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), PUB. L. NO. 107-16 §662(a),
amending I.R.C. §404(k)(2)(a) (allowing employers to deduct dividends paid on ESOP shares when those
dividends are, at election of participants, paid to ESOP and then reinvested in employer stock).
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in employer stock. 17
Even though ERISA does not require employers to offer such plans, employers who
choose to do so must abide by ERISA’s strict standards of fiduciary conduct.18 First, ERISA
stipulates that a fiduciary must discharge all duties in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan.19 Second, fiduciaries are required to act “solely in the interest
of plan participants and beneficiaries,” for the “exclusive purpose” of providing benefits to
them.20 Third, ERISA fiduciaries must discharge their duties “with the care, skill, prudence and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use […].”21
In addition to the duties of loyalty and prudence, fiduciaries are bound by the duty of
diversification “so as to minimize the risk of large losses.”22 ERISA’s diversification
requirement, however, does not apply to the acquisition or holding of employer stock once a
plan or portion of a plan is designated as a participant-directed eligible individual account plan
(EIAP), including ESOPS and 401(k) plans.23 A conflict arises out of heavy employee
investment in company stock: ERISA fiduciaries, who are often corporate insiders, have a duty
to operate the plan exclusively for employees’ benefit 24 but may also wear a corporate hat and
“have financial interests that are adverse to the interests of the beneficiaries but in the best

17

29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A).

18

See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (2003).

19

Id. § 1107(a)(3)(A).

20

Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).

21

Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

22

Id. §1104(a)(1)(C).

23

Id. §1107(b)(2)(B). An EIAP is a profit sharing, stock bonus, thrift or savings plan, employee stock ownership
plan (“ESOP”) that explicitly provides for acquisition and holding of stock issued by the plan sponsor.

24

29 U.S.C. § 1001.
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interest of the company.”25
I.

ERISA & SECURITIES LITIGATION
There are several procedural and remedial differences between the ERISA fiduciary

breach claim and the securities class action based on the same allegations of misrepresentations
or nondisclosures. First, some ERISA plaintiffs would not have standing to sue under the
securities laws as a result of the purchase or sale requirement of rule 10b-5. Second, the set of
defendants intersects only incidentally because only named and functional fiduciaries may be
held responsible under ERISA. Third, ERISA plaintiffs have to meet a less stringent pleading
standard for fault than the pleading requirements for scienter in securities litigation. Fourth,
ERISA plaintiffs need only plead that their loss could be linked to a fiduciary wrongdoing,
whereas the securities plaintiffs must allege loss causation. Fifth, an ERISA lawsuit is not
subject to the discovery safeguards of the PSLRA. Finally, plaintiffs in a securities fraud action
generally can only recover actual damages, whereas “§502(a)(2) [of ERISA] encompasses
appropriate claims for ‘lost profits.’”26 Even thought ERISA plaintiffs must first establish the
fiduciary status of the defendants, this section discusses the most significant procedural and
remedial differences that make an ERISA cause of action more likely to survive a motion to
dismiss, and thus more likely to settle at a high value or to get to the merits than a securities
action based on the same allegations of misrepresentations or nondisclosures.
A. Procedural Differences
i. Bringing an ERISA lawsuit may provide a remedy to plaintiffs who could not
otherwise recover as a result of the ‘purchase or sale’ requirement of 10b-5

25

In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 550 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530
U.S. 211, 225 (2000)).

26

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 (2008) (fn. 4).

6

Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.27 In
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the U.S. Supreme Court held that standing to sue in
private actions under rule 10b-5 is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities.

28

Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the language of section 10(b)
compelled such result29 and that public policy demanded curtailment of the right of action to
avoid “the danger of vexatious litigation.”30 Thus, a plaintiff claiming not to have sold or not to
have purchased a security has no standing to sue under 10b-5.
ERISA on the other hand, requires only that a civil action be brought by a plan
participant, a beneficiary, or a plan fiduciary.31 Thus, ERISA plaintiffs who claim to have
remained invested in company stock because they relied on material fiduciary
misrepresentations or nondisclosures would have standing to sue under ERISA but not under
10b-5. Even those participants who rely on misrepresentations or nondisclosures and decide to
invest more heavily in company stock would have questionable standing under the securities
laws because the purchaser for 10(b) purposes may be deemed to be the plan, and the plan may
only transfer stock from different participant accounts and not actually purchase nor sale a
security.32 Thus, bringing an ERISA lawsuit may provide a remedy to those plaintiffs who
could not otherwise recover under the securities laws.
ii. Only named and functional fiduciaries may be liable under ERISA
27

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

28

421 U.S. § 723, 730 (1975).

29

Id. at 736 (“the principal express nonderivative private civil remedies, created by Congress contemporaneously
with the passage of § 10b […] are by their terms expressly limited to purchasers or sellers of securities.”).
30

Id. at 740.

31

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

32

See Mark Casciari and Ian Morrison, Should The Securities Exchange Act Be The Sole Federal Remedy For An
ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value Of Public Employer Stock? 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 657
(2006).

7

Any defrauding party may be held liable under 10b-5.33 The 1934 Act also creates
‘control person’ liability for "every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable."34 In addition, the PSLRA gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)
authority to prosecute individuals who aid and abet violators of the 1934 Act.35 Whereas any
individual who violates 10b-5 can be held liable for fraud, the first issue addressed by a court
considering an ERISA fiduciary breach claim is whether each defendant is a fiduciary with
respect to the plan.36
Whether a particular individual or entity is a fiduciary with respect to a plan is a highly
fact intensive inquiry.37 Every employee benefits plan covered by ERISA must have at least
one named fiduciary but others may be deemed functional fiduciaries based on the substantive
authority and particular function exercised vis-à-vis a plan.38 Although ERISA plaintiffs must
plead factual allegations establishing each defendant’s fiduciary status,39 courts have adopted a
liberal view of who qualifies as a fiduciary, a concept “to be construed liberally, consistent

33

17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. See Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: an Evolving
Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889 (2005).
34

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).

35

Id. § 78t(e) (An aidor or abettor is "any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person
in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title.").
36

Mulder v. PCS Health Sys., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 307, 313 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.
Benefit ERISA Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir.1995)).

37

See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (noting that fiduciary status under ERISA exists when
one is fulfilling certain statutorily defined functions).
38

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).

39

See e.g., Crowley v. Corning, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (ERISA fiduciary claims against
plan sponsor dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6) motion because complaint “contains no factual allegations which support
a claim that [plan sponsor] had de facto control over the Committee members.”); In re Providian Financial Corp.
ERISA Litig., No. C01-05027 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2002) (dismissing complaint because “plaintiffs have lumped
the various classes of defendants into an undifferentiated mass and allege that all of them violated all of the
asserted fiduciary duties.”).

8

with ERISA’s policies and objectives.”40 This expansive concept may apply to the plan
administrator, the plan sponsor, or to any director, to the extent that it exercises or retains any
of the functions listed in the statutory definition of ‘fiduciary’:

A person is a fiduciary to the extent that he: (i) exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of the assets, (ii) renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.41

An ERISA fiduciary can also be held liable for a breach committed by a co-fiduciary if
he knowingly participated in, tried to conceal an act or omission by another fiduciary, or
enabled another fiduciary to commit the breach.42 Although the concept of fiduciary is
expansive, a misrepresentation actionable through the securities laws may not be actionable
under ERISA unless the particular individual or entity making the statement is a fiduciary with
respect to the plan. Thus, the fact that “the set of potentially responsible parties [may]
intersect” is only incidental.43
iii. ERISA’s pleading standard for fault is less stringent than the pleading
requirement for scienter in securities litigation
The PSLRA, enacted by Congress to curb the "abusive practices committed in private
securities litigation,”44 requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with [scienter].”45 The Supreme Court has defined ‘scienter’

40

In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F.Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2004).

41

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).

42

Id. § 1105(a).

43

Rogers v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008).

44

H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 730.

45

15 U.S.C. § 78 u-4(b)(2).
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as a “cogent and compelling” inference of an intent to deceive or defraud. 46 Thus, a complaint
will survive a motion to dismiss “only if reasonable person would deem the inference of
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged.”47
Most courts agree that ERISA does not have heightened pleading requirements, 48 but is
subject to the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a),49 or to the heightened pleading standard of
Rule 9(b) if allegations of fiduciary breach involve fraud.50 However, the Supreme Court has
recently held in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly51 (an antitrust case), that a plaintiff must
allege at the pleading stage facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”52 Thus far, several federal courts and circuits have applied Twombly outside the antitrust
context,53 including to claims of ERISA fiduciary breach.54 Their application of Twombly,

46

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,127 S.Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007).

47

Id.

48

See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“ERISA
does not even have heightened pleading requirements, but is subject to the notice pleading standard.”) (citations
omitted).

49

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requires a “short and plain statement” of the relevant elements showing that the plaintiffs
are entitled to relief). See e.g., In re Dynegy Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 867 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(“ERISA does not have heightened pleading requirements.” ).

50

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("[I]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity"). See, e.g., Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995); Hill v.
Bellsouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2004). But see Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 866 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (“While some of the allegations in support of [plaintiffs’] claim are similar to fraud allegations, i.e.
that [defendants] provided false and misleading information, the gravamen of [plaintiffs’] claim is grounded in
ERISA. The heightened pleading requirement under Rule 9(b) will not be imposed where the claim is for a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.”).

51

127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).

52

Id. at 1966.

53

See e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that at the very least, Twonbly ought to apply in
cases “where massive discovery is likely to create unacceptable settlement pressures.”); Victaulic Co. v. Tieman,
499 F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2007); Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007).
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however, has been uneven because the Court did not specify whether this standard applies to
all civil actions55 or the level of factual detail that it requires.56 Nonetheless, even if Twombly
raises the level of scrutiny at the pleading stage, satisfying its “plausibility” standard is
significantly less burdensome than the stringent pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
iv. Securities plaintiffs must allege loss causation, whereas ERISA plaintiffs
need only have suffered losses that could be linked to a fiduciary breach
The PSLRA also makes clear that a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 case "shall have the
burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant […] caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”57 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff must allege in his complaint loss causation—that the defendant's
misrepresentation (or other fraudulent conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff's economic
loss.”58 A mere allegation that the plaintiff "paid artificially inflated prices” as a result of the
misrepresentations is not sufficient because the loss occurs only when the truth is disclosed and
the stock price falls as a result.59
In contrast, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, ERISA plaintiffs need only satisfy
the more flexible pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)—a pleading

54

See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008)(“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level[.]”); see also Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516 (2008) (“a complaint
containing a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action is
insufficient”); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2008) (“While a complaint […] does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligations to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions.” (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 167)); Wilson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

55

Id. at 1998 (Stevens J. dissenting) (noting that whether the new pleading standard will apply in civil cases is “a
question that the future will answer.”).
56

See generally Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent Developments: A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading
Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twonbly, 127 S. Ct. 1995, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 830 (2008).

57

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).

58

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).

59

Id. at 347.
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must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”60 Thus, ERISA plaintiffs need only show that they suffered losses that “could be
linked” to nondisclosures or misrepresentation by a fiduciary acting in a fiduciary capacity.61
Some courts, however, have dismissed claims that earlier disclosure of nonpublic information
would have prevented or minimized losses because, under the efficient market hypothesis, had
the company publicly released the information earlier, the market would have adjusted
immediately and the plan would have sustained the same loss it incurred following the
announcement.62
For instance, the district court in Graden v Conexant Systems, Inc., dismissed claims
that the defendants violated ERISA fiduciary duties by failing to disclose to plan participants
that the company was in a precarious financial condition following a merger.63 The court
rejected the claim for failure to plead loss causation: “due to the almost immediate market
internalization of any announcement by [the defendant], no loss to Plaintiff could be linked to
the alleged wrongdoing.”64 In contrast, the court in In re Honeywell International ERISA
Litigation rejected this argument,65 reasoning that, while full disclosure may not have
prevented the losses incurred by the plan on stock already held, disclosure would have
prevented the plan from acquiring additional company stock at an inflated price.66

60

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

61

Graden v. Conexant Systems, Inc., No. 05-695 (SRC) (D.N.J. Aug. 27 2008) (unpublished 8/27/08).

62

See Edgar v. Avaya, 503 F.3d 340, 350 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

63

See Jo-el Meyer, Court Finds Nondisclosure of Merger Snags Wasn't a Breach; Other ERISA Claims Survive, 8
PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA) 168 (Aug. 29, 2008).

64

Id.

65

In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585, 41-42 (2004).

66

Id. at 42.
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v. The ERISA lawsuit is not only subject to less stringent discovery rules but
may also allow securities plaintiffs to bypass the discovery safeguards of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss by a defendant in a securities action, the PSLRA
provides that there will be an automatic stay in discovery, unless the plaintiff will suffer
improper or unfair detriment or a loss of evidence might result.67 Without the ability to engage
in discovery, plaintiffs face a higher cost in identifying specific misleading statements and
omissions and in determining their materiality. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, unable to increase the
amount of information against defendants or to pursue an aggressive discovery strategy, are
less likely to obtain a large settlement or to reach the merits of the case.
In contrast, ERISA civil actions are subject to the full set of discovery rules established
in Federal Rule Civil Procedura 26(b): ERISA allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding
any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”68 Moreover,
some courts have been willing to lift the discovery stay in companion securities actions where
defendants have already produced documents to plaintiffs in parallel ERISA or derivative
suits.69 In In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Master File Litigation, the court held that the
intended purpose of the discovery stay—minimizing frivolous class action filings and
preventing “fishing expeditions”—should not prevent the securities plaintiffss from having
access to documents already made available to the U.S. Attorney, the S.E.C., and plaintiffs in a
separate ERISA action.70 Strategically, filing an ERISA lawsuit in addition to the securities

67

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).

68

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

69

Sherrie R. Savett 1620 PLI/Corp 57, Plaintiffs' Vision Of Securities Litigation: Trends/Strategies, Practicing
Law Institute, 2005-2007, September-October, 2007 at 107.

70

234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec., & ERISA Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4048, (Mar. 12, 2004) (lifting stay where documents had been produced to government agencies and
were going to be produced to the ERISA plaintiffs).
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action may allow plaintiffs to circumvent the discovery safeguards of the PSLRA and deploy
the tools of discovery to uncover wrongdoing or exert settlement pressures.
B. Scope of Remedies
Defrauded investors who satisfy the elements of 10b-5 may recover out-of-pocket
monetary “actual damages.”71 However, because the rule 10b-5 cause of action is implied,
neither Section 10(b) nor Section 10(b)(5) establishes specific measurements for damages.72
The Supreme Court in Affiliated Citizens of Utah v. United States, outlined the traditional “outof-pocket” theory for damages in 10b-5 claims: damages would be measured by the difference
between the value of what the seller received for the shares and the fair market value of the
shares at the time of the sale. 73 When the defendant received more than the seller's actual loss,
damages are the amount of the defendant's profit.74 Even though Section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act75 and 21D(e) of the PSLRA76 provide definitions regarding damages, the law
remains open ended in regard to recovery. For instance, the Second Circuit has allowed
‘benefit of the bargain’ damages under Rule 10b-5 but only "where misrepresentation is made
in [...] tender offer and proxy solicitation materials as to the consideration to be forthcoming

71

See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (a).

72

See generally Ana Morales Olazabal, Analyst and Broker-dealer Liability under 10(b) for Biased Stock
Recommendations, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 76 (2004); Robert B. Thompson, The Measure Recovery Under Rule
10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (1984).

73

406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).

74

Id.

75

15 U.S.C. 78bb(a) (1997).

76

PUB. L. 104-67 (adding Sec. Ex. Act section 21D(e)(1)).
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upon an intended merger."77 Otherwise, a plaintiff's lost profits are not recoverable in Rule
10b-5 actions.78
Whereas recovery under the securities law is limited to actual damages, the scope of
remedies under ERISA is broader than under 10b-5. ERISA provides two main avenues for
relief for a breach of fiduciary duty. First, under ERISA 502(a)(2), the Secretary of Labor, a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue to seek relief for a breach of fiduciary duty
authorized by Section 409 of ERISA.79 Section 409(a) makes a fiduciary who breaches his
fiduciary responsibilities personally liable “to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through the use of assets of the plan.”80 Second, ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
authorizes suits by participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries to recover “appropriate equitable
relief.”81
Until recently, Supreme Court precedent, had been applied to bar recovery for breach of
fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2) if the remedy inured to an individual or an individual
account and not to “the plan as a whole”. 82 The Supreme Court revisited this interpretation of
section 502(a)(2) in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates Inc., holding that section

77

Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir.1981).

78

See, e.g., Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 876, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

79

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).

80

Id. § 1109(a).

81

Id. §1132(a)(3)(B).

82

Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (recovery under section 502(a)(2) must
“inure[…] to the benefit of the plan as a whole.”).
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502(a)(2) "authorizes recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a
participant's individual account." 83
Relying on LaRue, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently held in Rogers v.
Baxter International Inc., that the beneficiary of a defined-contribution account who suffered a
loss attributable to a pension plan fiduciary's alleged imprudent investment may obtain relief
even though other participants are uninjured.84 Therefore, post-LaRue, claims filed under
Section 502(a)(2) by plan participants whose individual retirement plans have been depleted or
depreciated by fiduciary breach arising out of misrepresentations or nondisclosures will not be
dismissed on the ground that there was no loss to the entire plan. 85
Also important to misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims is footnote 4 of the
opinion, where Justice Stevens notes that “§502(a)(2) encompasses appropriate claims for ‘lost
profits.’”86 Therefore, even if the scale of a case is insufficient to give rise to plan wide
litigation, if only one participant suffers a significant loss due to a fiduciary breach, he may
bring a lawsuit to recover lost profits—that is, “whatever would have been [in his individual
account] had the plan honored the employee’s entitlement, which includes an entitlement to
prudent management.”87 The Court’s conclusion that “the legal issue under Section 502(a)(2) is

83

128 S. Ct. at 1026. LaRue was a participant in DeWollff’s 401(k) plan who instructed the administrator and a
fiduciary of the plan to make certain changes to his 401(k) plan. His instructions were not followed and, as a
result, LaRue’s individual account plan was depleted by approximately $150,000.00. See LaRue v. Dewolff,
Boberg & Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 572 (2006) (vacated, LaRue, 128 S. Ct. 1020).

84

Rogers, 521 F.3d at 705. Baxter concerned a single participant alleging that plan fiduciaries breached the duty
of prudence by allowing participants to invest in company stock “despite knowing that the stock was overpriced in
the market and hence a bad deal.” Id. at 704.

85

Jo-el J. Mayer, Litigation 'Floodgates' Will Not Be Opened By Court's LaRue Decision, 8 PENS. & BEN. REP.
(BNA) 68 (April 9, 2008) (quoting statement by panelist Bob Eccles of O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.).
86

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (fn. 4).

87

Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 804-805 (7th Cir. 2007).
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the same whether [the participant’s] account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets of the
plan”88 expands the scope of ERISA remedies available to ERISA plaintiffs.
II.

THE QUESTION OF DUTY
A. ERISA Duty of Disclosure
Courts have increasingly been required to consider the extent, if any, to which ERISA's

fiduciary standards encompass a fiduciary duty to disclose information to participants beyond
ERISA's express reporting and disclosure requirements.89 There is a considerable amount of
confusion and inconsistencies in the case law on whether such duty exists and if so, under what
circumstances it applies. Over the years, some issues have settled. The Supreme Court has
made clear that when a fiduciary speaks in a fiduciary capacity, it has a duty to speak truthfully
and completely even if those communications are not required by ERISA.90 Courts, however,
have struggled to determine whether a communication made or adopted by an ERISA fiduciary
has a sufficient nexus to the plan or benefits thereunder to be deemed fiduciary in nature.
A more difficult duty question arises when the fiduciary remains silent about a material
fact that a reasonable plan participant would need to know to protect his interest in the plan.
The question of whether ERISA’s fiduciary standards encompass a duty to disclose is “area of
developing and controversial law.”91 A great number of ERISA plaintiffs have argued that plan
fiduciaries had a duty to disclose to them material nonpublic information necessary to
appreciate the true risk of investing their retirement savings in company stock.

88

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024.

89

See generally Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever A Fiduciary Duty To
Disclose? 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 979 (1993).
90

See Varity 516 U.S. at 506 ("[L]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.”).

91

In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 555 (S.D. Texas 2003).
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Although some courts have refused to create affirmative disclosure duties beyond
ERISA’s explicit requirements,92 other courts relying on fiduciary principles and the law of
trusts, have found that ERISA’s fiduciary duties encompass an affirmative duty to disclose
material information when the fiduciary is on notice that silence might be harmful.93 These
courts, however, have also struggled to determine under which circumstances, if any, the
fiduciary is on notice that silence may be harmful so as to trigger disclosure obligations.94 Thus
far, most of these cases have settled in the million dollars95 partly because the case law on
ERISA disclosure duties "is complex, rapidly developing, and uncertain."96
The Secretary of Labor has taken the view that: “ERISA’s duties of prudence and
loyalty not only forbid fiduciaries from misleading plan participants, but may, under some
circumstances, also require fiduciaries to disclose information that participants need to protect
their interests, even if the disclosure is not specifically requested or otherwise mandated in
ERISA’s reporting and disclosure provisions.”97 The Secretary has recently intervened as

92

See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995) (Congress did not intend to
supplement ERISA's reporting and disclosure scheme “by a far away provision in another part of [ERISA.]");
Varity, 516 U.S at. 489 (ERISA does not require employers “to keep plan participants abreast of the plan
sponsor's financial security."); Ames v. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 170 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he affirmative
obligation to disclose materials under ERISA […] extends only to a defined set of documents").

93

See, e.g, Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2007); Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d 1171,
1180 (3d Cir. 1995) (the duty of ERISA fiduciaries to inform is "not only a negative duty not to misinform, but
also an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful." Id.).
94

See Palen v. Kmart Corp., 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000) (ERISA fiduciary on notice that “silence might be
harmful” when it provided only health insurance information in response to plaintiff's request that defendant
continue all of decedent's benefits, even though plaintiff did not specifically mention life insurance).

95

See, e.g., In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig. (ERISA claim settled for $47 million); In re
ADC ERISA Litig., ($3.25 million, Sept. 2006); In Re Allegheny Sec., Litig., $4 million (Dec. 2006); In re AOL
Time Warner Inc. ERISA Litig., ($100 million, Sept. 2006); In re Broadwing ERISA Litig., ($11 million, Oct.
2006); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., ($28 million, June 2006).
96

See GM, Employees Reach $37.5M Settlement To End ERISA Fiduciary Breach Claims, PENS. & BEN. DAILY
(BNA) (Jan. 18, 2008) (quoting motion for approval of the settlement).
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amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs appealing to the Seventh Circuit the lower court’s
dismissal of allegations that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose to
plan participants the fees paid by the plan and revenue sharing payments.98 Although not
explicitly disagreeing with this holding, the Secretary strongly rejected the district court’s
reasoning that “[w]here as here Congress has by statute and related regulation, created detailed
rules governing disclosure requirements, it would be inappropriate to ignore and augment them
using the general power to define fiduciary obligations.”99 Thus, to the extent that the law is
unclear, a plan fiduciary cannot “rely on the regulatory requirements to satisfy its disclosure
obligations” even if it has not otherwise misled participants.100
i. Mandatory Disclosure Obligations
Part I of ERISA establishes a comprehensive set of reporting and disclosure
requirements.101 The first requirement is that the terms of each employee benefit plan be set
forth in a written plan document.102 The plan administrator must communicate these terms in
the form of a ‘Summary Plan Description’ (SPD) to plan participants within 90 days of
becoming covered.103 The SPD must be comprehensive in describing a participant’s and
beneficiary’s rights and obligations under the plan—which includes information such as the
plan’s sources of financing and the names and addresses of the people who exercise authority

97

Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Elaine L. Chao, As Amicus Curiae In Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, No. 07-3605, 08-1224, p.10, Hecker v. Deere, No. 06-C-719-S (W.D. Wis. Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter
“Amended Brief”].

98

See Hecker v. Deere, 496 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D.W. 2007).

99

Id. at 974.

100

Amended Brief, supra note 96, at 10.

101

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.

102

Id. § 1102(a)(1)).

103

Id. § 1024(b)(1)).
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over the plan. In addition, the SDP must be "written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant" and must contain information concerning the plan's governance
"sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably appraise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan."104
In addition to the Summary Plan Description, the plan administrator must give
participants a Summary Annual Report (SAR) within seven months of the close of each plan
year that summarizes the plan's financial operations for the year.105 In the case of a defined
benefit pension plan, the SAR must also include a statement regarding the plan's compliance
with ERISA's minimum funding standards.106 Upon request, a participant is entitled to receive
a copy of the full annual report that the plan administrator must file each year with the Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Labor.107 The full annual report must contain detailed
information concerning the plan's financial status.108
Satisfying ERISA’s explicit disclosure obligations, however, does not shield an ERISA
fiduciary from liability. The Secretary of Labor has noted that “[n]othing in the text of the Act
or the regulations governing annual reports (Forms 5500) and summary plan descriptions
indicates that those requirements were intended to be the exclusive disclosure obligations of
prudence and loyalty.”109
ii. Duty to Speak Truthfully and Completely
104

Id. § 1022(a)); see also DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758, 769 (E.D. Va. 2005).

105

29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3).

106

See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)-10(d). ERISA's minimum funding standards apply to defined benefit pension
plans and money purchase pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1081.
107

29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). All three filing requirements are satisfied by filing a Form 5500 (Annual Report) with
the IRS, which forwards copies to the DOL and the PBGC. See IRS Publication 1048; 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1)(A);
29 C.F.R. § 2520.104a-5(a)(2).
108

See 29 U.S.C. § 1023; 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103.

109

Amended Brief, supra note 96, at 20.
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When an ERISA fiduciary communicates with plan participants in a fiduciary capacity,
it has a duty to speak truthfully and completely even if those communications are not required
by ERISA.110 The seminal Supreme Court case spurring causes of action for fiduciary
misrepresentations is Varity Corp. v. Howe.111 In Varity, the company had spun off a number
of its non-profitable divisions to a separately incorporated company and intentionally misled its
employees to think that their benefits would remain secured if they transferred to the new
company. 112
The Supreme Court held that Varity was acting in its fiduciary capacity because “a
reasonable employee could have thought that Varity was communicating with them both in its
capacity as employer and its capacity as plan administrator,”113 and that it breached its
fiduciary duties by knowingly misrepresenting the security of the transferred employees’ future
benefits.114 The Supreme Court made clear, however, that a company does not act as a
fiduciary “simply because it made statements about its expected financial condition” or
because “an ordinary business decision turn[ed] out to have an adverse impact on the plan.” 115
Instead, the Court found a fiduciary breach because the company knowingly connected
materially misleading statements about the subsidiary’s financial health to statements it made
about future benefits “so that its intended communication about the security of benefits was
rendered materially misleading.” 116

110

Varity, 516 U.S. at 506.

111

516 U.S. 489 (1996).

112

Id

113

Id. at 502.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 505.
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Under the Court’s reasoning in Varity, communications by the company in S.E.C.
filings or corporate communications about the health of the company or its stock would not be
actionable unless given in connection with (implicit or explicit) advice to plan participants
about the suitability of investing in company stock. To give rise to liability under Varity, there
must be link between the false or misleading information about the company and a fiduciary
discretionary decision to disseminate such information in a manner reasonably calculated to
influence plan participants’ benefits decisions.
For instance, in In re Sprint Erisa Litigation, the court denied a motion to dismiss
claims that defendants had made false material representations to plan participants where an
employee newsletter contained highly optimistic statements on company growth that were
intended to address the soundness of investing in company stock. 117 The court noted that the
misleading statements in question were contained in an employee newsletter that was
disseminated with the intent to recommend plan participants to invest more heavily in the
company stock.118 Thus, having disseminated false or misleading material information
sufficiently relevant to plan benefits decisions—a fiduciary discretionary decision—the
company was on notice that silence could be harmful and had a duty to disclose to the extent
necessary to correct or make the previous statements not misleading. 119

116

Id.

117

388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1229-29 (D. Kansas 2004).

118

Id. at 1226.

119

Id.; see also In re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 362 F.Supp.2d 461, 477-79 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that plaintiff
stated a claim for failure to inform by alleging that the defendants had “created an inaccurate impression of the
future prospects of the Company”); In re Electronic Data Systems Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F.Supp.2d 658, 67273 (E.D.Tex.2004) (plaintiff stated a claim for failure to inform because defendant fiduciaries misled participants
in 401(k) about risks of investment in company stock in its public filings); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312
F.Supp. 2d 898, 916 (E.D.Mich. 2004) (duty to inform exists when defendants provided misleading information
about soundness of company stock).
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Courts, however, have disagreed as to whether false or misleading statements in S.E.C.
filings are per se fiduciary by reason of incorporation into the SPD, or whether dissemination
is required to give rise to fiduciary liability. Absent additional facts, most courts have found
that such act of incorporation as required by ERISA section 404(c)120 does not involve any
fiduciary discretion and therefore, does not give rise to fiduciary liability.121 Some courts have
allowed a theory of incorporation by reference to survive the motion to dismiss level, reasoning
that anything incorporated into the Summary Plan Description (SPD) may be deemed a
fiduciary communication.122
Other courts have reasoned that false or misleading statements in S.E.C. filings are
actionable only if the fiduciary decides to speak by disseminating the statements to plan
participants in a manner reasonably calculated to influence a benefits decision. For instance,
the court in In re Dynergy Inc ERISA Litigation held that misrepresentations in S.E.C. filings
that had been incorporated into the SDP became actionable only when the company
encouraged plan participants to review the filings carefully. 123 The court reasoned, consistent
with Varity, that such communication was sufficiently related to benefits decisions to be
deemed fiduciary and to trigger a duty to speak truthfully and thus to investigate before
speaking.124 The court noted, however, that had the fiduciaries not disseminated the

120

29 U.S.C. § §1106, §1107.

121

See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 2004 WL 2903889, *6 (D.N.H. 2004) (noting that “[a]lthough
plaintiffs plainly had a right to expect that Tyco International would refrain from making material misstatements
in its SEC filings, that expectation must be enforced under the securities laws rather than ERISA”).
122

See In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“ERISA fiduciaries,
however, cannot in violation of their fiduciary obligations disseminate false information to plan participants,
including false information contained in SEC filings.” Id.); see also Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 876-877
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Defendants had a duty under securities laws not to make any material misrepresentations;
they also had a duty to disseminate truthful information to plan participants, including the information contained
in SEC filings. [T]heir duties under ERISA and securities law co-exist.” Id.).

123

In re Dynegy, Inc. Erisa Litig, 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 890 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

124

Id.
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information, they would not have assumed an independent duty to investigate and correct
statements about the stock made by non-fiduciaries via securities filings.125
iii. Duty to Correct
The duty to speak truthfully and completely also encompasses a duty to correct
mistakes in previous fiduciary communications when information later reveals that the
communication was false when made. The difficult issue arises when an ERISA fiduciary
adopts or disseminates to plan participants a non-fiduciary statement that, unbeknown to the
fiduciary, is false or misleading when made. As previously noted, courts disagree as to whether
false or misleading statements in S.E.C. filings are per se fiduciary communications or whether
dissemination is required to give rise to fiduciary liability.
Even though “ERISA does not impose affirmative disclosure obligations to correct the
misstatements of others made to the market,”126 some courts have stated that if a fiduciary
makes or disseminates a statement sufficiently related to a benefits decisions, he is under a
duty to investigate before speaking, to speak truthfully, and to correct statements made by nonfiduciaries, even if those statements are made in securities filings.127 For instance, In re
Honeywell Int’l ERISA Litigation, the court accepted plaintiff’s theory that plan fiduciaries that
distributed the SPD thereby adopted the misleading statement in S.E.C. filings and had an
affirmative duty to correct subsequent S.E.C. disclosures to the extent they knew that the
subsequent filings contained material misrepresentations.128

125

Id.

126

Id. at 884.

127

Id. at 890; see also Shirk v. Fifth Third Bancorp, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1100429 (S.D. Ohio 2007).

128

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585, *9 (2004) (D. NJ. 2004); see also In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig.,
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2374989 (D.N.J. 2007).
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The case law suggests that a duty to correct can only arise if (i) the person who made or
disseminated the particular statement was a fiduciary to the plan; (ii) the false or misleading
statement was sufficiently related to the plan or benefits thereunder to be deemed fiduciary
under Varity; (iii) the fiduciary knows or should know (through reasonable investigation) that
the communication was false or misleading when made, and (iv) a reasonable plan participant
would rely on the statements in making benefits-related decisions.
iv. Duty to Update and/or to Warn
Varity involved a company knowingly connecting materially misleading statements
about the financial health of its subsidiary to statements it made about future benefits. The
Supreme Court, however, specifically reserved the question of “whether ERISA fiduciaries
have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response
to employee inquiries.”129 Thus, a more controversial issue is whether a fiduciary has a duty to
warn participants or update them about financial and business developments if circumstances
have changed to an extent that participants are acting upon information or representations
about the company that are no longer accurate.
The requirement that fiduciaries speak truthfully means that their statements must be
true when made. Thus, courts have generally found that the duty not to mislead is not breached
if subsequent developments make an earlier communication or representation false or
materially misleading.130 Whereas the duty to correct may be derived from the general duty not
to mislead or misrepresent, the duty to update must be analyzed solely as a subset of the more
controversial duty to speak when the fiduciary is on notice that silence might be harmful.

129

Varity, 516 U.S. at 506.

130

See, e.g., Swiney v. GMC, 46 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An employer is not liable for breach of fiduciary
duty under [ERISA] if the statements were made in good faith and the statements indicated the employer's actual
intent at the time.”).
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Several courts applying ERISA fiduciary standards have found a duty to update written
statements if the fiduciary knows or should know that the communications have become
misleading because a change in course is under serious consideration.131 Other courts have
imposed an affirmative duty to inform or warn participants where a fiduciary has reason to
know of a particular beneficiary’s need for information and thus is on notice that silence would
be harmful.132 Such limited duty only arises “if there was some particular reason that the
fiduciary should have known that his failure to convey information would be harmful.”133
Other courts have found such duty to exist only if the fiduciary has promised to update the
participants on certain matters.134 This affirmative disclosure duty, however, has generally
been found in cases concerning plan terms and requirements, matters of plan administration, or
tax or other legal issues affecting participant plan elections.135
The question arises whether fiduciaries would have a duty to update participants of
material non-public business or financial developments that render investment in the company
stock imprudent where the fiduciary is on notice that the participants need such information to
protect their assets. On the one hand, courts have made clear that “plan administrators are not
required to inform all plan participants and beneficiaries of every corporate event, especially

131

McAuley v. IBM Corp. Inc., 165 F.3d 1038 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that SPDs should remain accurate and
non-misleading throughout the availability of the plan, thus finding a duty to correct any misleading information
and to update any information that has become misleading).
132

Stabile, supra note 5 (quoting Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2000); Barker v.
Am. Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Corp., 244 F.3d 819,
826-827 (11th Cir. 2001).

133

Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114-115 (1st Cir. 2002).

134

Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A, 220 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2000); Broga v. Northeast Utilities, 315 F.Supp. 2d
212 (D. Conn. 2004).
135

Stabile, supra note 5, citing In re Unysis Corp., 242 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing possible
affirmative duty to correct plaintiffs’ mistaken belief that they were entitled to lifetime health plans); Krohn v.
Huron Men’l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 548 (6h Cir. 1999) (finding an affirmative duty to disclose where plaintiff’s
husband made specific inquiry regarding disability benefits).
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contingent events, that might impact the value of the company’s common stock.”136 On the
other extreme, “when fraudulent acts threaten to impair and diminish the value of the plan's
investment,”137 a breach of duty may lie where the fiduciary fails to take steps to protect the
assets of the plan.138
B. Disclosure Duties under the Securities Laws
Disclosure is at heart of the federal securities laws.139 However, the securities
disclosure architecture stands on the foundational stone that the materiality of a piece of
information is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to require its disclosure.140 Some
information may be material—that is, likely to be important to the reasonable investor,141 but
an issuer may have no duty to disclose it unless it has: (i) a duty to disclose the information as
required by the S.E.C., (ii) a duty to speak truthfully and completely, (iii) a duty to correct, (iv)
a limited duty to update (in some circuits), (v) a duty to disclose or abstain, or (vi) a duty to
disclose publicly information selective disclosed (Reg FD). Even though material
misrepresentations by the issuer are always actionable under 10b-5, the difficult duty question
arises when the company chooses to speak in a way that is not a clear misrepresentation of the
truth or when the company chooses to remain silent. 142
i. Duty to Disclose Information Required by the S.E.C.
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Sweeney v. Kroger Co., 773 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also Cokenour v. Household Int’l Inc.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 ,*24 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that defendants are not required “to continuously gather
and disclose nonpublic information bearing some relation to the plan sponsor's financial condition”).
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Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963, 969 (D.N.J. 1992).
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Id.
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Donald Langevoort, The Muddled Duty to Disclose under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L REV. 1639, 1640 (2004).

140

Id., (citing e.g., Baron v. Smith, 285 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103 (D. Mass. 2003)).

141

See generally James Cox et al., SECURITIES REGULATION, Ch.. 11 (4th ed. 2004).

142

Langevoort, supra note 139, at 1640.
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It is well established that a material misrepresentation in a document filed with the
S.E.C. leads to liability under Section 18 of the Exchange Act and to 10b-5 exposure.143 The
difficult question is whether investors are entitled to rely on the completeness of required
disclosure items. Courts have generally refused to find a duty to disclose arising out line-item
disclosure requirements so that silence is not actionable under Rule 10b-5 for remaining silent
when disclosure was required.144
1. Management Discussion and Analysis
Item 303(a) of regulation S-K requires issuers to disclose known trends and
uncertainties (except for merger negotiations) that are reasonably likely to occur, unless
management determines that, even if the uncertainty comes to fruition, it will not have a
material effect—favorable or unfavorable—on the registrant’s financial condition or
operations.

145

Even though the S.E.C. has explicitly required such disclosure, courts have

generally refused to find that there is a fraud-based duty to disclose “known trends and
uncertainties” under item 303(a), possibly because of its forward-looking nature or its
heightened materiality standard.146
For instance, in Oran v. Stafford, the Third Circuit held that a private right of action for
alleged violations of Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K does not exist.147 The court reasoned that a
violation of Item 303 is not the equivalent of a Section 10(b) violation as a matter of law

143

Id. at 1653.

144

See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1982).
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Prospective Information, Financial Reporting Release N. 36, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 24,
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because the materiality tests under SK-303 differs greatly from the materiality tests for
securities fraud.148 However, at least one district court has held that allegations claiming a
violation of Item 303 could support valid claims under Rule 10b-5. 149
2. Form 8-K
In response to the recent corporate scandals and the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act,150 there may be a trend towards requiring more real-time disclosure of corporate events.
Section 409 of SOX authorizes the S.E.C. to require public companies to disclose material
changes in the financial or operational condition of the issuer on a rapid and current basis.151
Even though section 409 is “intended to provide investors with better and faster disclosure of
important corporate events,”152 the S.E.C. has interpreted this invitation narrowly by
incorporating new categories of events that trigger 8-K filings and shortening the disclosure
deadline, but generally confining these events to extraordinary and out-of-the-course of
business developments.153
The S.E.C. also adopted a limited safe harbor from public and private claims under
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for a failure to timely file a Form 8-K for seven
items.154 Material misstatements or omissions in a Form 8-K, however, remain subject to
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.155 In addition, the safe harbor extends only until the due
date of the company's next periodic report.156 Failure to make such disclosure in the periodic
report will subject a company to potential liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, in
addition to potential liability under Exchange Act Section 13(a) or 15(d).157
ii. Duty to Speak Truthfully and Completely
Even if not required, when a corporation chooses to speak in a manner calculated to
influence investors—whether in public statements or S.E.C. mandatory disclosure items, there
is a duty to speak truthfully and completely.158 Courts agree that materially misleading public
statements or misrepresentations in forms 10-K or 10-Q and other mandatory disclosure items
give rise to 10b-5 exposure.159 Thus, if private information makes public statements materially
misleading, courts generally have found a contemporaneous duty to disclose to the extent
necessary to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading.160 This duty, however, is limited because courts are very reluctant to find that
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a disclosed statement is misleading even if not qualified or accompanied by an appraisal, a
prediction, or an estimate that is materially inconsistent with the disclosed statement. 161
Statements of opinion may also be actionable under the antifraud provisions if they are
objectively false. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,162 the Supreme Court held that
directors’ recommendation to shareholders to approve a going-private transaction because the
offer was a “fair price” and a “high value,” was objectively false because the directors had
objective evidence before them that was inconsistent with their professed opinion.163 Under
this reasoning, a statement of opinion may be actionable under 10b-5 but only if the opinion is
deceptive—it is objectively wrong and the speaker knows it. Such feigned opinions are
properly deemed untrue statements of fact.
iii. Duty to Correct
A corollary of the duty not to mislead or misrepresent is the duty to correct mistakes in
previous disclosure documents or statements. The duty to correct applies when a company
makes a material statement that, at the time made, it believed to be true, but as revealed by
subsequently discovered information actually was not. For instance, in In re Healthcare
Compare Corp. Securities Litigation,164 the court held that a company would have a duty to
correct upon discovering information regarding patient enrollments when the information was
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in existence when the misstatements was made but was unknown to management.165 As to
erroneous statements made by third parties, courts generally hold that there is no duty to
correct statements by others unless the company has “placed its imprimatur, expressly or
impliedly, on the [third party’s statements].”166
iv. Duty to Update
Courts disagree as to whether there is a duty to update previously disclosed information
if new developments make it untrue or materially misleading. Whereas most circuits have
rejected a duty to update,167 a few circuit courts have recognized such duty in limited
circumstances where the nature of the statement is such that it explicitly or implicitly invites
future reliance and operates as a continuing representation of its accuracy.168 For instance, in In
re Time Warner Securities Litigation,169 the Second Circuit recognized the possibility of
liability for failure to update when Time Warner hyped strategic alliances as a source of debt
financing but also began to consider an equity offering as an alternative source of financing.170
The court held that when a company announces a goal as well as the intended approach for
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reaching it, the corporation might come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to
reaching the goal when those approaches are under active and serious consideration.171
Similarly, in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., the Third Circuit found a duty to update about
merger negotiations that would cause the company to exceed the amount of debt allowed under
its previously announced policy of an appropriate debt-equity ratio.172 However, even the
courts accepting a duty to update have been careful to distinguish forward-looking statements
about company policy—financing strategy as in Time Warner or capitalization policy as in
Weiner—from forward-looking statements about ordinary course of business matters, such as
pricing strategies,173 that need not be ‘updated’.
In contrast, other courts have emphatically rejected a duty to update. In Gallagher v.
Abbott Laboratories, Judge Easterbrook stated the creation of a duty to update was the
province of the S.E.C. or Congress and not the courts.174 He reasoned that imposing such duty
would effectively mandate continuous reporting and that “judges have no authority to scoop
political branches and adopt continuous disclosure under the banner of 10b-5”175 when the
S.E.C. had made the judgment that “firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well
as bad news) unless positive law creates a duty.”176 However, even if the circuit recognizes a
duty to update, it would be very narrow in scope because most corporate statements speak to
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current state of the company and do not operate as a continuing representation.177 In addition,
an issuer should be able to defeat any duty to update claim by disclaiming in plain and clear
language any intention to take on a responsibility to update a statement.
v. Duty to Disclose or Abstain
Rule 10b-5 prohibits corporate insiders from trading company stock on the basis of
material nonpublic information known to one party of the trade but not the other.178 Trading on
such information qualifies as a “deceptive device” under § 10(b), because "a relationship of
trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation [and
that] relationship [gives] gives rise to a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading because of
the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider from […] taking unfair advantage of […]
uninformed […] stockholders.”179
The insider-trading prohibition applies to sales of an employer's stock by ERISA
fiduciaries and plans that acquire material nonpublic information.180 In order to avoid insidertrading liability, a fiduciary who has access to non-public information must either disclose such
information to the public or abstain from trading.181 Thus, neither the ERISA plan nor the
ERISA fiduciary can sell the employer stock that the plan already holds based upon
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confidential non-public information because such a ‘purchase or sale’ would violate insidertrading laws. 182
A plan sponsor could also be subject to liability for insider trading as a tipper if it
provided material nonpublic information to the Plan or its participants. Such liability would
attach only if the plan sponsor passed the information for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, some personal or economic benefit.183 Although the necessary type of benefit has
not been precisely defined, the S.E.C. takes the position that intangible benefits, such as a
desire to enhance one's reputation, are sufficient.184 Accordingly, a desire to confer a benefit on
employees or avoid a breach of fiduciary duty claim may also be sufficient to establish tipping
liability. Thus, neither fiduciaries nor participants can trade while in possession of material,
nonpublic information.185
vi. Duty to Disclose Publicly Information Selectively Disclosed
Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) prohibits selective disclosure of inside information
concerning company stock to any “holder of the issuer's securities, under circumstances in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer's securities on
the basis of the information.”186 Thus, if a selective disclosure is made to a party who will be
trading on the information, such as a 401(k) plan participant, full public disclosure is required
simultaneously, if disclosure was made on purpose; or subsequently, if disclosure was

182
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accidental.187 A Reg FD violation does not require scienter or breach of fiduciary duty, but it is
enforceable only by the S.E.C. and does not give rise to 10b-5 liability.188 Thus, if a corporate
insider who is also an ERISA fiduciary communicates information about the possibility of
accounting fraud or other material information about the company solely to employees who
will be trading on the information, the fiduciary may be subject to a cease-and-desist order,
judicial enforcement action, or a civil penalty.189
III.

OVERLAPPING, CONTRADICTORY OR COMPLIMENTARY DISCLOSURE CLAIMS?
The ERISA and the securities lawsuit arising out of a common nucleus of operative

facts may be combined and brought before a judge for coordinated or consolidated
proceedings.190 However, the general consensus is that the numerous distinctions between the
ERISA and the securities fraud cases warrant both separate consolidation and separate trial.191
For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio recently declined to
transfer a proposed ERISA fiduciary breach class action against Macy’s to a New York federal
court where two securities lawsuits were pending based on the same misrepresentations and
nondisclosures.192 The court reasoned that, even though similar, “[the] ERISA matter and the
securities action in New York are not identical [to] necessarily require transfer”193 even though
such transfer would promote judicial economy.
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Whereas this reasoning may hold true for misrepresentation and failure to correct
claims, the inevitable intersection between the ERISA and securities nondisclosure claims
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the disclosure duties of ERISA fiduciaries, if
any, without a clear reference to whether there was a duty to disclose the information under the
securities laws.
A. Misrepresentation and Failure to Correct Claims
ERISA fiduciary misrepresentation and securities fraud are distinct causes of action that
intersect incidentally: only fiduciary communications are actionable under ERISA, the standard
of materiality may be different, and a fiduciary breach need not constitute fraud or be
committed with scienter as required by a 10b-5 action. Thus, a showing of ERISA fiduciary
breach based on a misrepresentation need not be grounded on a securities law violation.
Conversely, a misrepresentation that is actionable under the securities laws need not give rise
to ERISA liability if it is not fiduciary in nature.
i. A false or misleading statement is actionable under ERISA only if it is a
fiduciary communication
Both ERISA and the securities laws impose a duty not to mislead or misrepresent.
Whereas there is no fiduciary requirement under the securities laws, actionability of a false or
misleading statement under ERISA depends on whether the fiduciary makes, adopts or
disseminates the false or misleading statement in a fiduciary capacity—that is, the statement is
sufficiently related to the plan or benefits thereunder to satisfy the Varity standard.194 As the
Varity decision noted, a company does not act as an ERISA fiduciary “simply because it made
statements about its expected financial condition.”195 Those statements must be linked to
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statements about plan benefits in order to be actionable under ERISA. In this sense, the
standard of actionability is more stringent than the securities law standard.
There is one potential gray area blurring the distinction between corporate
communications and fiduciary communications—whether statements in S.E.C. filings that
have been incorporated in the SPD or public statements of the company that have been
disseminated by plan fiduciaries would be deemed fiduciary communications for purposes of
ERISA. The judicial consensus seems to be that mere incorporation of S.E.C. filings into the
SPD is not a fiduciary act.196 Liability would require that the information be made or
disseminated by an ERISA fiduciary in a manner reasonably calculated to influence plan
participants’ benefits decisions; and that the fiduciary knows or should know that the
information was false or misleading when made.
ii. The ERISA standard of materiality may be lower than the Securities standard
A statement is material in the ERISA benefits-related context “if there was a substantial
likelihood that it would have misled a reasonable participant in making an adequately informed
decision about whether to place or maintain monies in a particular fund.”197 Under the
securities law, information is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that [its] disclosure
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available.”198 Whereas some communications may be deemed
immaterial under the securities law, an immaterial misrepresentation may invite greater
reliance by plan participants if the statement is made, endorsed or disseminated by a plan
fiduciary.
196
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For instance, a statement may be deemed ‘puffery’ for purposes of securities litigation
because a reasonable investor would find it unimportant to the total mix of information
available to the market. However, if the same statement is endorsed or disseminated by a plan
fiduciary, it may be taken more seriously by plan participants who—because of lack of
sophistication or a greater belief in the competence of plan fiduciaries, rely more heavily on
their recommendations. Thus, a false or misleading statement may not be deemed material
enough to establish the type of fraud that is actionable under 10b-5. But the fiduciary who
knew or should have known that a corporate communication was false or misleading but still
endorsed, adopted, or disseminated it should be liable for his breach of duty.
iii. A fiduciary breach need not constitute fraud or be committed with scienter as
required by a 10b-5 action
The standard for liability in an ERISA lawsuit is significantly lower than the burden to
show scienter required to prevail in a securities 10b-5 action. Scienter is generally defined as
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”199 or at least severe
recklessness.200 In contrast, a lack of intent to deceive does not insulate a fiduciary from
liability: “a fiduciary breaches its duties by materially misleading plan participants, regardless
of whether the fiduciary's statements or omissions were made negligently or intentionally.”201
A finding of fiduciary breach turns on whether the fiduciary knew or should have known
(through reasonable investigation) that the communication was false or misleading when made.
Thus, defendants sued for the same actions under both statutes may not be liable under 10b-5 if
they lacked the required intent to manipulate, deceive or defraud, but may be liable under
199
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ERISA if a reasonably prudent fiduciary would have acted otherwise. ERISA’s duty of
prudence may be breached by mere inaction.
iv. Both ERISA and the Securities Laws impose a Duty to Correct but ERISA’s
duty to Correct is Limited to Fiduciary Communications
The securities laws impose a duty to correct material misstatements that at the time
made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered information
actually was not. As to statements made by third parties such as analysts, courts generally hold
that there is no duty to correct under the securities laws unless the company has “placed its
imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the [third party’s statements].”202 Under ERISA,
fiduciaries must correct mistakes in previous fiduciary communications when information later
reveals that the communication was false when made.
ERISA, however, “does not does not impose affirmative disclosure obligations to
correct the misstatements of others made to the market.”203 The case law suggests that a duty to
correct arises under ERISA when and only if: (i) the person who made or disseminated the
particular statement was a fiduciary to the plan; (ii) the false or misleading statement was
sufficiently related to the plan or benefits thereunder to be deemed fiduciary under Varity; (iii)
the fiduciary discovers or should have discovered (through prudent investigation) that the
communication was false or misleading when made, and (iv) a reasonable plan participant
would rely on the statements in making benefits-related decisions.
If a material false or misleading statement is both a corporate and a fiduciary
communication, correction would be mandated by the securities laws and by ERISA. For
instance, in WorldCom, plan participants alleged that WorldCom’s S.E.C. filings contained
material misrepresentations regarding WorldCom’s financial condition. The court held that
202
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“WorldCom had a duty to correct any prior material misrepresentations when it became aware
of its falsity”204 and that such correction would have been consistent with ERISA.205 However,
ERISA fiduciaries would have no duty to correct corporate communications that are not made
in a fiduciary capacity, even though from a plan participant’s perspective, fiduciary statements
may be indistinguishable from non-fiduciary communications.
B. Failure to Disclose Claims
The most difficult and interesting issues arise when ERISA plaintiffs claim an
entitlement to non-public company information regarding financial and business operations
that the company has not revealed to the public at large but that the fiduciary has acquired in its
corporate capacity. The difficulty of defining the contours of an ERISA disclosure fiduciary
duty is further aggravated because the question of duty under the securities laws is muddled
with complexities that may be resolved differently from court to court.206
Although the ‘duty to disclose’ question under the securities laws is not clear-cut, in
theory the company either has a duty to disclose or has the right to remain silent. Several
fiduciary duty question arise out of these two scenarios: (i) whether the fiduciary would violate
his fiduciary duties by failing to disclose information that is required to be disclosed under the
securities laws, (ii) whether the fiduciary would breach his duties by failing to disclose material
information about the company that does not give rise to 10b-5 liability, and if so, (iii) whether
the fiduciary would be required to selectively disclose the information to plan participants.
The confusion in the case law arises mainly because these three distinct questions have
generally been framed or analyzed as one—whether plan participants have a superior right to
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information than other shareholders of the company. It is clear that neither the courts, the
Department of Labor, nor the S.E.C. would allow plan fiduciaries to trade or to cause to trade
while in the possession of material, non-public information.207 As the Enron court noted:
“[l]ike any other investor, plan participants have no lawful right, before anyone else is
informed of Enron's negative financial picture, to profit from fraudulently inflated stock prices
or to avoid financial loss by selling early before public disclosure.”208 Selective disclosure
would not “protect any lawful financial interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries.”209
The two other questions are more difficult to answer and, at the motion to dismiss level,
probably a practical impossibility. Although courts are not explicitly articulating it, analytically
the initial inquiry seems to be whether plan participants are entitled (or likely to be entitled) to
the information under the securities laws as shareholders of the company. If the answer is
‘definitely yes’, then the issue is whether fiduciaries on notice of the securities violation have a
heightened duty to provide that information to plan participants even if it would force its public
disclosure. If the answer to whether the company is required to disclose the information is ‘no’,
the question would be whether plan participants, even if not entitled to the information as a
matter of securities laws, are nonetheless in a relationship of trust such that fiduciaries on
notice that silence might be harmful have a duty to make disclosures to plan participants and to
the investing public to the extent necessary to protect the assets of the plan.
Not surprisingly, courts faced with the intersections and ambiguities of two complex
bodies of federal law have reached inconsistent results. At the motion to dismiss level, some
207

See Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2001 WL 1836286, at 23-24 (D.S.C. Feb. 9,
2001) (no duty to provide inside information—any duty due is owed to the market); see also S.E.C. Release Nos.
33-7881 and 34-43154, at pt. III(A)(2) (Final Rule on Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading), 2000 S.E.C.
LEXIS 1672 (Aug. 15, 2000) (plan administrator cannot influence buying or selling of shares by plan while in
possession of material, nonpublic information).
208

284 F. Supp. 2d at 565.

209

Id.

42

courts have found a duty of disclosure to the extent necessary for plan participants to
appreciate the risks of investing in company stock and make informed decisions vis-à-vis their
investments.210 Other courts have limited such duty only to special circumstances where the
information would have an “extreme impact” on plan beneficiaries.211 These courts have
generally faced factual allegations against fiduciaries who were on notice that the company
was not disclosing material information (arguably or likely) in violation of the securities laws.
However, when ERISA plaintiffs have argued that they were entitled to company information
beyond the requirements of the securities laws, courts have been reluctant to impose through
the backdoor a new set of disclosure obligations under the guise of ERISA fiduciary duties.
i. An affirmative duty to disclose non-public information beyond the
requirements of ERISA and the securities laws would put ERISA fiduciaries
in the untenable position of determining what information to disclose to
reconcile their duties towards shareholders and plan participants
Courts have generally dismissed claims that plan fiduciaries failed to disclose adverse
non-public information of business and financial material events affecting the value of
company stock when the securities laws would not require such disclosure. For instance, in
Hull v. Policy Management Sys. Corp, the court dismissed a claim against a 401(k) plan’s
administrative committee members who were sued for failing to disclose adverse non-public
information regarding the company’s value and failing to divest the plan of company stock in
light of such information.212 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs sought to impose a higher
standard of care on ERISA fiduciaries with respect to plan investment in company stock as
opposed to other securities, and that this standard of care would be illegal and unreasonable:
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In many respects, this standard would put the [c]ommittee in the untenable situation of
choosing one of three unacceptable (and in some cases illegal) courses of action: (1)
obtain ‘inside’ information and the make stock purchase and retention decisions based
on this ‘inside’ information; (2) make the disclosures of ‘inside’ information itself
before acting on the discovered information, overstepping its role and, in any case,
likely causing the stock price to drop; or (3) breach its fiduciary duty by not obtaining
and acting on ‘inside’ information.213

Similarly, the district court in Cokenour v. Household International Inc. declined to
grant a motion to dismiss, but noted that defendants have no duty to continuously gather and
disclose nonpublic information bearing some relation to the plan sponsor’s financial
condition,” especially when disclosures “would simply have accelerated the demise of the
household stock held by the fund. Their duties as fiduciaries were to prevent such loss.”214 This
reasoning, however, may be adequate for failure to disclose financial and business information
not required to be disclosed by the securities laws but fiduciaries cannot have a duty to prevent
losses to a plan by concealing a securities law violation or delaying compliance with the
securities laws.
ii. A heightened disclosure duty on ERISA fiduciaries on notice of fraudulent
concealment of information would only force compliance with the securities
laws
Courts faced with allegations of nondisclosures that amount or could amount to
securities fraud have decided motions to dismiss in favor of the ERISA plaintiffs. For instance,
in Shirk v. Fifth Third Bancorp, plan participants alleged that plan sponsors breached their
fiduciary duties, inter alia, by failing to disclose complete and accurate information regarding
Fifth Third Stock when the company was allegedly concealing its financial problems. 215 The
court concluded that “[a] claim is actionable for allegedly not disclosing negative information
concerning investment in Fifth Third Stock, such that the Plan’s participants could not
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appreciate the true risks presented by investments in Fifth Third Stock and could not make
informed decisions regarding investments in the Plan.”216 The court further added that “a duty
to disclose exists under ERISA and Plaintiffs have stated a claim for a breach of that duty.”217
Even though the holding was stated in very general terms—whether the participants
were provided information about the true risks of investing in company stock so that they could
make an informed decision,218 the court was faced with allegations that the company was
concealing its financial problems likely in violation of the securities laws. Holding that
fiduciaries can stand still while on notice that the company is engaging in misbehavior that
could amount to securities fraud would be akin to holding that fiduciaries have no duty to act
when on notice that plan assets are being misappropriated. The result would not be consistent
with ERISA’s stated mission of establishing high standards of fiduciary conduct.
Similarly, a heightened duty of disclosure on ERISA fiduciaries when the information
would probably give rise to 10b-5 liability would resolve 10b-5 ambiguities on the duty to
disclose question in favor of ERISA plaintiffs. Because the fiduciary’s conduct must be judged
pre-ante, imposing a duty to disclose material information that could arguably be required
disclosure under 10b-5 would be consistent with ERISA’s high fiduciary standards and with
the disclosure goals of the securities laws. As previously noted, there is an open question
around the circuits as to whether failure to comply with mandatory disclosure items gives rise
to 10b-5 fraud-based liability and if so, under what circumstances.219 Imposing a duty on
ERISA fiduciaries to disclose such information may resolve these questions in favor of ERISA
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plaintiffs who would (arguably) be entitled to the information regardless of whether its
concealment actually gives rise to fraud-based duties.
iii. Fiduciaries have a heightened duty of disclosure when on notice of a (likely)
securities law violation that threatens the assets of the plan but have no duty
to disclose financial and business information where the securities laws would
not require such disclosure
Even though a clear standard has not been articulated yet, a careful examination of the
case law suggest that when the securities laws do not require disclosure of adverse business
and financial information, courts are generally unwilling to impose independent disclosure
requirements on ERISA fiduciaries. In contrast, courts are willing to entertain claims that
ERISA fiduciaries have a heightened duty of disclosure when on notice that the company is
engaging in corporate fraud or is otherwise violating the securities laws. The question
underlying the legal analysis seems to be: who should bear the risk of loss when the value of
the company stock plummets, plan participants or plan sponsors and fiduciaries? Whereas
employees, like other investors, have assumed the risk of a normal downswing of the business
cycle, they have not assumed the risk that plan sponsors or fiduciaries with experience,
expertise, and inside access, will conceal information in violation of the securities laws.
This implicit analysis provides the appropriate standard: ERISA fiduciaries have no
duty to disclose financial and business information beyond statutory obligations, unless on
notice that the assets of the plan are being threatened by corporate misconduct, including
violations of the securities laws. Such duty, however, is better analyzed as a subset of the
general fiduciary duty to act when on notice that plan assets are at risk of being
misappropriated, depleted, or diminished by corporate misconduct, and not as an independent
disclosure duty under ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.

46

CONCLUSION
This Article provided an overview of the procedural, remedial, and substantive
differences between the ERISA and the securities misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims.
Procedurally, ERISA may allow plaintiffs to proceed with claims that would not otherwise
support a securities class action because of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements.
ERISA also allows plaintiffs to proceed with discovery even if discovery has been stayed in the
companion securities case. Thus, ERISA plaintiffs are more likely to avoid an early stage
dismissal of their case, proceed to discovery, and obtain a favorable settlement.
ERISA also affords significant substantive advantages over traditional securities suits.
First, the securities laws offer protection only to actual purchasers or sellers, whereas ERISA
may offer redress to plan participants who were defrauded or misled into holding their
securities. As to misrepresentation claims, once the ERISA plaintiffs have established the
fiduciary nature of a communication, a showing of ERISA fiduciary breach is less burdensome
than satisfying the elements of fraud under 10b-5. More complex issues arise when ERISA
plaintiffs allege that misrepresentations in corporate communications or S.E.C. filings are
fiduciary in nature. Such claims may be resolved under Varity’s requirement that there be a
link between the false or misleading statement and a fiduciary decision to disseminate the
information in a manner calculated to influence plan participants’ benefits decisions.
Nondisclosure allegations raise more interesting intersections with the securities laws.
This Article distinguished between claims that fiduciaries have a duty to speak when on notice
that the company is engaging in corporate fraud or is otherwise violating the securities laws,
and allegations that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose non-public information that the
company is entitled to keep silent. A careful examination of the cases reveals an emerging
standard: absent a securities law violation, an ERISA fiduciary cannot breach his duties by
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standing on the company’s right to remain silent under a periodic disclosure system.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the law remains unclear, ERISA fiduciaries cannot rely on
satisfying statutory disclosure requirements to avoid the risks of litigation.
By exploiting the legal uncertainty surrounding the question of duty and the procedural
advantages provided by ERISA, plaintiffs’ lawyers have exerted (sometimes) unwarranted
settlement pressures on defendants fearing potentially massive discovery and litigations costs.
There is a pressing need to clarify the legal standards and to effect procedural harmonization at
the pleading stage to expose groundless claims at the point of minimum expenditure of time
and money. A failure to effect procedural harmonization may have unintended consequences if
actual or perceived risk of fiduciary liability deters capable persons from serving as ERISA
fiduciaries. The cost of these suits may ultimately be borne by employees themselves if, as a
result of greater plan expenses and higher insurance premiums, plan sponsors curtail or stop
providing their employees with retirement benefits instead of mitigating risk by exercising
more caution.
The stakes are high: the resolution of these issues implicates the financial security of a
large part of the country’s aging population,220 the financial and legal stability of plan sponsors
and fiduciaries facing litigation on two fronts, and the scarce judicial resources of the federal
courts confronted with the difficult task of reconciling two different lines of duty. While no
comprehensive resolution of these issues seems imminent in the federal courts, the pressing
need for clarity and predictability invites legislative action, or joint action by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Department of Labor .221
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